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V.	Recommendations		
The	application	of	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	to	Bolivia	and	its	lithium	deposits	
complicates	this	dream	of	lithium,	and	indicates	as	well	that	the	national	government’s	ability	
to	govern	this	natural	resource	to	these	standards	is	not	possible	at	this	time.	However,	this	
doesn’t	suggest	that	the	state	couldn’t	manage	the	extraction	of	lithium	to	some	degree	or	will	
undermine	this	project	to	the	point	that	it	isn’t	beneficial.	Rather	it	suggests	ways	that	the	
Bolivian	national	government	can	improve	its	natural	resource	governance.	In	this	section,	I	will	
lay	out	these	challenges	and	ways	in	which	they	can	possibly	be	mitigated	or	resolved.	Some	of	
these	challenges,	such	as	improving	the	administrative	capacity	of	the	Bolivian	national	
government,	could	have	their	own	respective	theses.	I	have	grouped	these	challenges	into	
broad	overarching	themes	that	are	more	a	narrative	than	a	point	by	point	analysis.		
First,	a	large	concern	that	exists	for	this	project	is	how	the	Bolivian	national	government	
sees	it	in	context	of	the	overall	economy.	As	described	earlier,	Bolivia	operates	within	a	
neoextractivist	framework	where	the	state	relies	heavily	on	its	hydrocarbons	sector	for	its	
economy,	the	wellbeing	of	its	citizens,	and	for	its	fiscal	regime.	This	dream	of	lithium	as	
evidenced	by	state	rhetoric	falls	within	this	same	framework.	However,	while	the	Bolivian	
government	has	benefited	in	the	past	from	this	neoextractivist	developmental	model,	lower	
commodity	prices	threaten	its	longevity.	This	is	recognized	by	the	state	government	as	well.	I	
would	be	particularly	concerned	if	the	Bolivian	national	government	maintains	or	sees	lithium	
as	a	future	analog	to	its	hydrocarbon	sector,	rather	than	as	an	opportunity	to	diversify	the	
economy	in	general.	The	extraction	of	lithium	at	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	could	possibly	be	a	
significant	opportunity,	but	the	state	shouldn’t	conceive	of	it	as	the	sole	option	to	diversify	the	
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economy	and	to	bring	in	private	investment.	The	state	should	maintain	an	accurate	
understanding	of	its	lithium	base	and	should	seek	to	find	appropriate	terms	with	foreign	
partners	so	that	it	does	not	stunt	the	potential	of	this	industry.	Rather	than	clouding	this	
resource	with	ambition	and	rhetoric,	an	accurate	and	clear	projection	of	the	Salar	de	Uyuni’s	
resources	may	help	the	Bolivian	state	accomplish	its	goals,	while	also	presenting	transparent	
information	to	its	citizens.	In	all,	Bolivia	should	see	the	production	of	lithium	an	opportunity	to	
further	diversify	the	economy	in	light	of	its	dependence	on	hydrocarbons.		
Another	broad	issue	concerning	this	project	is	corruption	and	the	actual	implementation	
of	the	Bolivian	legal	framework	by	its	institutions.	Widespread	corruption	within	the	Bolivian	
state	could	affect	its	ability	to	properly	manage	its	lithium	deposits.	Secondly,	neoextractivism	
has	taken	precedence	over	the	rights	afforded	to	indigenous	groups	and	stipulations	regarding	
water	and	the	environment.	For	instance,	despite	a	framework	of	rights	codified	to	indigenous	
peoples	within	Bolivia’s	constitution,	like	the	right	to	prior	obligatory	consultation,	the	actual	
upholding	of	these	rights	does	not	occur	to	the	degree	that	they	should.	This	not	only	
undermines	Bolivia’s	legal	framework,	but	conflicts	between	indigenous	groups	or	local	peoples	
and	the	national	government	could	occur	in	the	future	because	they	weren’t	consulted	prior	to	
the	implementation	of	this	lithium	project.	This	observation	leads	to	more	narrow	challenges	
that	are	specific	to	this	lithium	project	and	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	region.		
The	Bolivian	national	government	should	rethink	its	national	strategy	if	it	has	not	
already	done	so.	Since	the	project	is	significantly	behind	schedule,	a	new	roadmap	that	is	
realistic	could	help	the	government	effectively	govern	this	resource.	However,	a	national	
strategy	that	is	comprehensive	also	means	that	the	state	should	take	into	account	the	
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detrimental	externalities	of	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	that	could	affect	the	state’s	ability	to	
industrialize	its	lithium	resource.	Simply	put,	the	state	should	not	push	ahead	to	the	industrial	
production	of	lithium	without	ensuring	that	its	process	for	doing	so	is	profitable	in	the	context	
of	the	larger	marketplace.	Given	that	the	state	has	at	times	not	conducted	public	spending	
programs	effectively,	this	could	be	a	real	concern.	There	are	various	accounts	or	speculations	
about	the	Salar	de	Uyuni’s	value,	so	it	is	difficult	to	say	if	this	will	become	in	monetary	terms	a	
great	benefit.	Corporations	that	are	looking	to	extract	lithium	or	need	it	may	look	to	other	
countries,	like	Chile	or	Argentina.	Another	issue	within	constructing	a	viable	and	beneficial	
national	strategy	for	this	lithium	project	is	that	of	consultation.		
For	instance,	the	Bolivian	government	maintains	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	as	a	fiscal	reserve,	
but	the	boundaries	of	this	reserve	are	opaque.	This	could	become	a	source	of	conflict	for	the	
various	communities	in	the	area	and	the	state.	The	state	here	should	consult	with	the	local	
communities	to	make	clear	these	differing	accounts	of	territory.	The	Bolivian	government	
should	also	strive	to	engage	and	involve	all	of	the	various	groups	and	individuals	of	the	Salar	de	
Uyuni	region.	Politicizing	consultation	and	not	addressing	concerns	now	may	lead	to	conflict	in	
the	future	or	affect	the	state’s	ability	to	best	implement	the	industrial	production	of	lithium.	I	
am	particularly	concerned	that	the	Bolivian	state	has	not	taken	the	appropriate	steps	to	
determine	the	extent	to	which	the	lithium	project	will	affect	the	environment,	particularly	local	
water	resources.	This	could	severely	impact	local	quinoa	farmers	whose	livelihood	is	intimately	
attached	to	this	resource	within	this	ecosystem.	Effects	to	tourism	and	quinoa	production	must	
be	mitigated	as	the	local	communities	and	individuals	could	have	their	livelihoods	rendered	
unsustainable	if	local	water	resources	are	effected	severely.	However,	their	concerns	may	be	
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ignored	in	light	of	neoextractivism;	this	is	again	a	recurring	challenge	or	theme	for	the	Bolivian	
government.	The	national	government’s	prioritization	of	natural	resources	comes	into	conflict	
with	its	own	legal	standards	as	well	as	the	ones	that	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	suggest.		
Finally,	as	shown	by	the	analysis	of	hydrocarbon	revenues,	the	Bolivian	national	
government’s	intentions	towards	uplifting	the	well-being	of	its	citizens	is	apparent.	
Hydrocarbon	revenues	are	intrinsic	to	the	functioning	of	subnational	governments	and	citizens	
have	likely	improved	from	the	state’s	social	services	programs.	This	idea	is	one	of	many	that	are	
present	in	its	neoextractivist	framework.	Its	allocation	of	revenues	could	be	improved	in	the	
case	of	a	lithium	project.	The	national	government	should	consult	with	local	communities	to	
balance	or	determine	the	allocation	of	revenues	given	to	the	Potosí	Department.	Since	the	
extraction	of	lithium	would	by	necessity	affect	them	the	most,	negative	ramifications	could	be	
partly	mitigated	by	earmarking	an	appropriate	amount	of	the	revenue	for	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	
region.	Given	the	poverty	present	here,	this	could	be	an	opportunity	for	the	national	
government	to	conduct	effective	social	programs	that	fall	in	line	with	their	stated	goals.		
The	state	should	also	look	to	better	target	its	citizens	living	in	extreme	poverty	and	
should	also	implement	studies	to	better	measure	the	impact	of	its	revenue	sharing	and	social	
programs	on	socioeconomic	indicators.	This	would	facilitate,	in	the	future,	more	effective	public	
spending.	This	implementation	is	dependent	on	building	the	administrative	and	institutional	
capacity	of	the	Bolivian	national	government,	and	this	again	remains	a	recurring	theme	for	
effective	natural	resource	governance	within	this	country.	The	Bolivian	national	government	
has	managed	its	economy	very	well	recently,	but	it	faces	challenges	in	the	future	because	of	
low	commodity	prices.	The	state	seems	to	be	on	the	right	approach	towards	diversifying	its	
	
	
	 63	
economy	to	alleviate	the	ramifications	of	low	commodity	prices.	It	has	also	maintained	strong	
fiscal	reserves	that	allow	it	to	alleviate	this	current	dilemma.	This	suggests	that	the	Bolivian	
national	government	can	manage	lithium	well	in	terms	of	revenues,	although	it	could	do	so	
more	effectively.		
Given	these	challenges,	and	in	line	with	the	last	section	of	the	application	stage,	the	
Bolivian	national	government	should	strive	to	meet	these	challenges	and	properly	account	for	
them.	I	am	however	skeptical	that	they	will,	given	this	neoextractivist	framework	that	the	
country	operates	through	as	well	as	problems	concerning	its	institutions,	like	corruption.	
Bolivia’s	civil	society,	its	media	and	its	non-governmental	organizations,	as	well	as	the	people	
living	around	the	Salar	could	check	or	influence	the	government’	behavior	towards	any	possible	
mismanagement	of	this	resource.	While	there	at	times	there	has	been	opposition	from	the	
state	against	these	organizations,	they	still	remain	as	a	tool	to	uphold	indigenous	rights	or	
reveal	issues	with	the	use	of	water	among	other	concerns.	International	organizations	like	the	
United	Nations	could	also	facilitate	the	Bolivian	state’s	ability	to	meet	these	standards	and	
challenges.		
The	national	government	of	Bolivia	has	the	capacity	to	realize	this	lithium	project	but	it	
may	not	have	the	capacity	or	the	intention	to	manage	it	beneficially	in	the	light	of	other	
stakeholders	and	the	concerns	laid	out	above.	There	are	particular	concerns	the	state	should	
overcome	and	it	may	do	so.	In	its	present	incarnation,	the	extraction	of	lithium	in	Bolivia	is	best	
described	as	hopeful.	People	are	hopeful	that	climate	change	can	be	mitigated	and	that	electric	
cars	will	become	increasingly	widespread.	The	companies	that	manufacture	electric	cars,	
lithium-ion	batteries,	and	extract	lithium	are	hopeful	that	this	becomes	the	case	too.	Bolivia	is	
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hopeful	that	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	becomes	a	valuable	resource	that	can	be	used	to	improve	the	
economy	and	to	uplift	its	citizens,	and	the	people	around	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	and	I	myself	hope	
that	the	state	can	manage	it	effectively.	Given	these	hopes	and	their	role	in	realizing	a	larger	
goal	of	mitigating	climate	change,	it	is	best	that	we	remain	cognizant	of	the	effects	a	shift	to	
electric	cars	entails.	Natural	resource	extraction,	particularly	that	of	oil	and	gas	and	now	
lithium,	has	consequences.	While	the	introduction	of	an	overall	more	beneficial	manifestation	
of	the	automobile	is	increasingly	possible,	we	should	be	aware	of	what	it	entails	in	its	entirety.	
It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	electric	cars	will	takeoff	and	whether	the	effects	of	this	takeoff	
will	distinctly	impact	Bolivia,	but	this	possibility	is	something	I	am	hopeful	that	one	day	the	
state	can	manage	beneficially.			
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